Abstract-This letter develops codes for the scenario in which users with correlated messages are to encipher and compress their messages without collaboration and without the use of cryptographic keys or other secret materials. We consider an eavesdropper that has access to an encoded message and in addition, some side-information in the form of uncoded symbols corresponding to the encoded message. Our codes are an extension of distributed source coding using syndromes (DISCUS) with the additional requirement of providing secrecy for the scenario described above. We state a secrecy condition that the subcodes of DISCUS must satisfy, and develop a general encoding algorithm meeting these conditions. We analyze the performance of the proposed code for the case of multiple eavesdropped messages.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

T
HIS letter extends and generalizes the problem in which two nodes with correlated messages wish to encipher and source code their messages without collaboration and without the use of cryptographic keys. An eavesdropper with access to only one encoded message learns as little as possible about that message, whereas a joint decoder with all encoded messages can decode the messages without error. 1 In [2] we derived the capacity region, i.e. the set of all possible source coding rate pairs and equivocation rate (our measure of secrecy) pairs. The capacity region showed that simply applying SlepianWolf (SW) encoding simultaneously achieves the optimal equivocation rates.
Although SW encoding alone suffices to achieve the optimal equivocation rates (a result of the capacity region), and therefore any distributed source code may be applied, in practice the resulting secrecy is mediocre, giving the eavesdropper too much information concerning the message without the eavesdropper having to do any work. Thus in [2] we defined a different measure of secrecy that not only resolves the shortcomings of simply using equivocation as the measure of secrecy, but also accounts for the possible scenario in which the eavesdropper has access to uncoded symbols from the message in addition to intercepting the corresponding encoded message (similar threat model as [3] ).
In [2] we gave a simple two-user example to demonstrate that the latter strong definition of secrecy is plausible. In this 1 This problem has for example applications in sensor networks in which energy-limited nodes must encode separately without collaboration [1] . Furthermore, node deployment in hostile envrionments makes cryptographic keys prone to capture or exposure and we thus avoid their use in our problem.
letter we derive general codes for any number of users, as well as analyze the case when the eavesdropper has access to multiple encoded messages. While the exploration of the capacity of various wiretap channel models has recently received much attention, practical coding for these models are emerging [3] - [7] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We define the problem for m users who have random messages (column vectors of elements from Galois field
k such that they are marginally uniformly distributed. On the other hand, the collection of all m messages obeys the correlation model
where w(·) is the Hamming weight, and addition is over GF (q) [8] . The m users are to separately and linearly encode (jointly encipher and source code) their realizations u (assuming he does not have u i,j as side-information already), the eavesdropper is faced with choosing u i,j ∈ S, such that S ⊆ GF (q) and its cardinality is at least 2 (i.e. |S| ≥ 2), and all elements in S are equally likely from the eavesdropper's point of view. This level of secrecy is not unconditional, but may be satisfactory for certain applications, e.g. lightweight video encryption.
III. RESULTS
Our codes belong to the class of distributed source coding using syndromes (DISCUS) [9] . In the DISCUS scheme, a supercode with the capability of correcting t-errors (the same t as in Eq. 1) is partitioned into m subcodes (where m is the number of users). The parity check matrices of these subcodes are then used in Eq. 2 to encode each of the user's messages, respectively.
A. Secrecy Condition on Subcodes
While the supercode requirement of being t-errorcorrectable aids decodability [9] , in [2] we showed that secrecy (as defined above) can be achieved by imposing that the subcodes are maximum distance separable (MDS) codes; this is re-iterated explicitly in Theorem 1 along with restrictions on the quantity of side-information available to the eavesdropper. 
B. Code Construction
We have conditions on the supercode (error correction capability equal to correlation [9] ) and the subcodes (MDS from Theorem 1) for DISCUS with secrecy. However, simply choosing MDS subcodes will often result in unacceptable supercodes. Similarly, choosing an acceptable supercode and arbitrarily partitioning the supercode into subcodes will often result in non-MDS codes, e.g. in [2] we showed this is the case for the DISCUS codes in [8] . This section derives codes that satisfy both conditions. Algorithm 1 provides a method of constructing DISCUS codes that are both decodable (zero errors), and secure in the sense developed in Section II. 3 An example for two users is given in [2] . Theorem 2: If H i , i = 1, . . . , m are selected using Algorithm 1 and the eavesdropper has side-information restricted to α i < a i (a i from Algorithm 1), then the encoding scheme is secure and uniquely decodable.
Proof: Matrix A is the generator matrix of a ReedSolomon code with minimum distance d min = k − (2s) + 1. Defining t k 2 − s satisfies the requirement k ≥ 2(s + t), and unique decodability is possible given the correlation model, Eq. 1, and given that the Slepian-Wolf (SW) constraints are satisfied.
Since H i is a (k − a i ) × k matrix from Algorithm 1, the side-information constraint α i < k − (k − a i ) = a i follows from Theorem 1. Furthermore, since each symbol in a message is independent over GF (k + 1), the source coding rate given by Eq. 6 and constrained by Eq. 7 is simply the Slepian-Wolf theorem. Therefore we have proved that zeroerror decodability is achieved given the above constraints are satisfied.
Next we must check that the H i s are parity check matrices of MDS codes for all i = 1, . . . , m (to satisfy Theorem 1). In (i) Symbols for all messages are from GF (k + 1) where k + 1 is a power of a prime number and k ≥ 2(s + t); (ii) Eq. 1 is satisfied; (iii) ξ is a primitive element in GF (k + 1) and
are a i × k matrices, and
for all i = 1, . . . , m satisfy i∈S
for all S ⊆ {1, . . . , m}. If this is not possible, then these rates cannot be used. general, partitioning a MDS code may not result in MDS subcodes. However, the choice of starting with A in Algorithm 1 facilitates the generation of MDS subcodes as we show. The parity check polynomial corresponding to the generator matrix A i is equal to
Therefore the generator polynomial corresponding to generator matrix A i is given by
where the final equality follows since ξ k+l = ξ l . Since the generator polynomial has roots that are consecutive powers of the primitive element ξ, the code it generates is by definition Reed-Solomon, which is MDS.
C. Example
We illustrate a numerical example for two users. In Algorithm 1 let s = 2, t = 5, k = 15, so k ≥ 2(s + t) is satisfied. Matrix A is then a 4 × 15 matrix. If we partition matrix A equally so that a 1 = a 2 = 2, then both users have the same rate of
, thus the SW constraints (Eq. 7) are satisfied as the reader may verify. To complete the example, the reader may derive parity check matrices H 1 and H 2 , corresponding to generator matrices A 1 and A 2 , respectively. Finally Eq. 2 can be applied to get the encoded messages.
D. Multiple Eavesdropping
Algorithm 1 only allows the eavesdropper to have access to one encoded message with some corresponding sideinformation. We now analyze the above code for the case when the eavesdropper has access to multiple encoded messages. . . . . . .
Eq. 8 will be conveniently denoted by x = Hu.
